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The Construction of Social Reality

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* View that the mind is just a set of higher-level features . of the brain, a set of features that are at once “mental” and “physical -
* Show how “culture” constructed out of “nature.” T
* Features of the world that exist independently of us and those that are dependent on us for their exisperu -\_
* Features that exist relative to the intentionality of observers, users, etc.
* Acts of observing and using are themselves intrinsic.
* Turn out that social reality in general can be understood only in light of the distinction.
  + Ontologically subjective; and the observer relative features inherit
  + Three distinctions cut across each other:
    - Intrinsic and the observer relative,
    - Ontological objectivity and subjectivity.
    - Epistemic objectivity and subjectivity.
  + Given it that for any observer-relative feature F, seembe F is logically prior to being F, because-appropriately understood-seeming to be F is a necessary condition of being F.

### The Assignment of Function

* Requires exactly three elements.
  + Function, =
  + Collective intentionality
  + Constitutive rules.
* Have to use institutional facts to explain institutional facts;
  + Rules to explain rules, and language to explain lan
* In the exposition of the theory I rely on the reader’s understanding of the phenomena to be explained. Put in the actual explanation given, is no circularity
* Capacity that humans and some other animals have to impose functions on objects,
* We do not experience things as material objects, much less as collections of molecules.
  + Such as rivers and trees
  + Build the object to serve a function.
  + -aesthetic, practical, and so
* functions are never intrinsic to the physics of any Phenomenon are assigned from outside by conscious observers and users.
  + Functions, short, are never intrinsic but are always observer relative.
    - Those parts of nature that are conscious, nature knows nothing of functions.
* Even when we discover a function in nature,
  + Causal processes together with the assignment of teleology to those causal processes.
* Discovery of a natural function take place only within a set of prior assignments of value (including purposes, teleology, and other functions).
  + No natural facts discovered beyond the causal facts.
* Defined in terms of causes,
  + Just causes like any others.
  + Defined in terms of the furtherance of a set of values that we ho survival, re — production, health-in which case they are observer relative.
  + Larry Wright’s articles in which he defines function
    - The function of X is Z means
      * 1. X is there because it does Z.
      * 2. Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there.
    - A naturalistic definition
    - Fail to capture certain essential features
* \*Intensionality-with-an-s should not be confused with intentionality-with-a-t.
  + Directed at objects and states of affairs in the world.
  + Property of sentences and other representations by which they fail certain test for extensionality.
  + Leibniz’s Law: If two expressions refer to the same object they can be substituted for each other in a sentence without changing the truth value of the sentence.
  + “Referential opacity.
    - The way in which an object is referred to affects the truth value
* Capacity of conscious agents to create social acts is
  + Functions are never intrinsic;
  + Assigned relative to the interests of users and observers.
    - Parts of a system where the system is in part defined by purposes, goals, and values generally.
    - Normative component in functions cannot be reduced to causation alone,
      * ✗ can have the function of Y-ing even in cases where X fails bring about Y all or even most of the time.
* Agentive and nonagentive functions.
  + Mark uses to which we put objects, functions that we do not discover, and that do not occur naturally, but that are assigned relative to the practical interests of conscious agents.
  + Uses to which agents intentionally objects, I will call them “agentive functions.”
    - Naturally occur such as a stone that we use as a paperweight; some are artifacts made specifically to perform
    - Be used to perform another,
  + Part of a theoretical account of the phenomena
    - Functions occurring in nature independently of the practical intentions and activities of human agents; nonagentive functions.”4
* By no means always, the case that agentive functions require continuous intentionality
  + Without any effort on our part.
  + Even when no one is paying any attention.
  + An agentive function may not be the agent who actually imposed the function on that object and may even be naware that the object has that function.
  + Standing for or representing something else.
  + Intentionally imposed intentionality on objects and states of affairs that are not intrinsically intentional.
    - Called “meaning” or “symbolism.
  + In the use of language we impose a specific function, namely, that of representing, onto marks and sounds.
* Functions may be imposed quite unconsciously, and
  + Money may simply have evolved without anyone ever thinking, “We are now imposing a new function on these objects”;
  + People may use money to buy and sell without thinking about the logical structure of imposed function.
    - All cases of agentive function, someone must be capable of understanding what the thing is for, or the function could never be assigned.
    - If we assign a function that is totally from human intentions, it would have to fall in the category of nonagentive functions.
    - First claim is about the intentionality of agentive function. The second claim is about nonagentive function.
      * Ask yourself what facts in the world would each claim true.
        + With which agents use objects as money. They use it for purpose of buying selling and storing value.
        + The second claim, like the claim that the heart functions to pump blood, would be true if and only if there is a set of unintended causal relations and these serve some teleology, even if it is not a teleology shared by the speaker.
* Terminology straight I will adopt the following conventions.
  + All functions are observer relative
    - Assigned or equivalently as imposed.
  + Within the category of assigned functions some are agentive because they are matters of the use to which agents put entities,
  + F assigned functions some are nonagentive because they are naturally occurring causal processes to which have assigned a purpose,
  + Agentive functions is a special category of those entities whose agentive function is to symbolize, represent, stand for, or—in general—to mean something or other.

### Collective Intentionality

* Not only that they engage in cooperative behavior, but that they share intentional states such beliefs, desires, and intentions.
* Cases where I am doing something only as part of our doing something.
  + I play my part in our performance thee symphony.
* Even most forms of human conflict require collective intentionality.
  + To be cooperating in having a fight in order for each
  + Understanding of collective intentionality is essential to understanding social facts.
* Infinite hierarchy of beliefs. \*
  + Biologically primitive phe omenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something else
  + Every attempt at reducing “We intentionality” to “I intentionality” that I have seen is subject to counterexamples¸«
* Etc., and you believing that I believe No set of “I Consciousnesses,” even supplemented with beliefs, adds up to a “We Consciousness.”
* A sense of doing (wanting, believing something together, individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they share -
* Genuine cooperative behavior
  + Happen to find that their behavior is synchronized.
* Why are we unwilling to recognize collective intentionality as a primitive phenomenon?
  + Accept an argument that looks appealing but is fallacious.
  + Anybody who recognizes collective intentionality as a primitive form of mental life must be committed to the idea that there exists some Hegelian world spirit, a collective consciousness, or something
* Methodological individualism seem to force us to reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality.
  + To choose between reductionism, on the one hand, or a super mind
  + Dilemma is a false one. It is indeed the case that all my mental life is inside my brain, and all your mental life is inside your brain, so on for everybody else.
    - Does not follow from that that my mental life must be expressed in the form of a singular noun phrase referring to me.
    - We intend,” “we are doing so-and-so,
* Expression “social fact” to refer to any fact involving collective intentionality.
  + Together
  + People are going tor a walk together is a ལས་ involving human institutions.

Constitutive Rules and the Distinction Between Brute and Institutional Facts

* Philosophy of languages
  + Brute physics and biology. On the one hand, and those features the world that are matters of culture and society, on the other.
  + Brute facts exist independently of any human institutions; instinational facts can exist only within human institutions. State the facts, but the brute facts themselves exist quite independently of language or of any other institution.
  + “Regulative” and “constitutive” rules¸»
    - Some rules regulate antecedently existing activities.
    - Can exist prior to the existence of that rule. Also create the very possibility of certain activities. Thus the rules of chess do not regulate an antecedently ex isting activity.
  + Rules are constitu. Of chess in the sense that playing chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules.
  + Counts as Y” or “X counts as Y in context C.”
* Institutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules.
  + Rules and not conventions.
  + “Convention” implies arbitrariness, but constitutive rules in general are not in that sense arbitrary:
    - Referentially opaque in that it does not permit of substitutability of coextensive expressions salva veritate.
      * 1. Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing(x&gt; count as money(Y) in the United States(C).
      * And 2. Money is the root of all evil. Do not imply
      * 3. Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing count as the root of all evil in the United States.
  + Referential opacity is a crucial point.
    - Provides a clue that there is a mental component institutional facts.
    - How do we make the connection between the fundamental ontology of conscious biological beasts like ourselves and the apparatus of social facts and human institutions?

## Creating Institutional Facts

* Elementary construction of social and the logical structure of the development of institutional facts from simpler forms of social facts.
  + Agentive functions, collective intentionality, and constitutive rules. ♫ will also attempt to explain several puzzling features

### Some Apparent Features of Social Reality

* Naive, intuitive features of social reality, including features of institutional facts, such as, for example, the fact that am an American citizen, as well as features of those social facts that
* The Self-Referentiality of Many Social Concepts
  + Concepts that name social facts appear to have a peculiar kind of self-referentiality
  + Definite inclusive disjunction of the form “x is used as money or x regarded as money or x is believed to be money, etc.’
    - Definition of the word “money,” is self-referential, because in order that a type of thing should satisfy the definition, in order that it should fall under the concept of money, it must be believed to be, or used as, or regarded as, etc, satisfying the definition.
    - Seems to be almost a logical truth that you cannot fool all the people all the time.
    - If everybody always thinks that this sort of thing is money, and they use it as money and treat it as money, then it is money. If nobody ever thinks this sort of thing is money, then it is not money.
  + We need to distinguish beinstitutions and general practices on the one hand and par ticular instances on the other, that is, we need to distinguish between types and tokens.
    - A single dollar bill might fall from the printing presses into the cracks of the floor and never be used or thought of as money at all, but it would still be money. In
    - A particular token instance would be money, even though no one ever thought it was money or thought about it or used it at all.
    - Is possible for people to be sys tematically mistaken. But where the type of thing is concerned, the belief that the type is a type of money is constitutive of its being in a way we will need to make fully clear.
  + For social facts, the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon.
  + Of being a cocktail party is being thought to be a cocktail party;
    - A remarkable feature of social facts; it has no analogue among physical facts.
* The Use of Performative Utterances in the Creation of Institutional Facts
  + Created by explicit performative utterances. “declarations.\*1
    - Create the very state of affairs that they represent; and in each case, the state of affairs is an institutional fact.
* The Logical Priority of Brute Facts over Institutional Facts
  + Not matter what the form is as long as it can function as money. But money must come in some physical form or other.
  + Physical realization.
    - Social facts in general, and institutional facts especially. Are hierarchically structured.
      * On top of brute physical facts.
      * Brute facts will not be manifested as physical objects but as sounds coming out of peoples’ mouths or as marks on paper-or even thoughts in their heads.
* Systematic Relationships Among institutional Facts.
  + An institutional fact cannot exist in isolation but only in a set of set of systematic relations to other facts.
    - System of exchanging goods and services for money.
    - Form of contractual relationships.
      * Have to understand such things as promises obligations.
  + Interlocking institutional realities.
  + At any instant in the scene,is dealing with property, restaurant, a waiter, a bill.
  + Game need have no consequences for tomor in a way that today’s wars, revolutions, buyings, and sellings are intended precisely to have consequences for tomorrow and into the indefinite future.®
    - There are systematic dependencies
      * Involve rights and responsibilities; and their positions actions or inactions are unintelligible without an understanding of these rights and responsibilities:
  + The extent that professional sports have such consequences, they cease to be just games and become something more, e.g., big business.
* The Primacy of Social Acts over Social Objects, over Products
  + Of the noun phrases conceals from us the fact that, in such cases, process is prior to product
  + Social objects are always, in some sense we will need to explain, constituted bY social acts; and, in a sense, the object is inst the continuous possibility of the activity.
    - A standing possibility
* Linguistic Component of Many Institutional Facts
  + Apparent feature that only beings that have a language or some more or less language-like system of representation can create most,
    - Perhaps all, institutional facts, because the linguistic element appears to be partly constitutive of the fact.
  + Apparatus necessary to represent something
    - Would seem to require a sysof representation such as language. L
      * Not only to represent these facts to ourselves; but in a way we will have to explain, the linguistic forms in question are constitutive of the facts.

### From Collective Intentionality to Institutional Facts: The Example of Money

* The selectional advantage of cooperative behavior is, trust, obvious. Inclusive fitness is increased by cooperating with conspecifics
  + Different content from the collective intentionality,
  + More than two to execute a pass play www ity, I have already stipulated that any fact involving collective intentionality is a social fact.
  + Collective intentionality can generate agentive functions as easily as individual intentionality.
  + Cannot be performed solely in virtue of the object’s intrinsic physical features,
    - Only as a matter of human cooperation.
      * Agreement or acceptance, is a crucial element in the creation of institutional facts.
  + A primitive tribe that initially builds a wall around its territory- The wall is an instance of a function imposed in virtue of sheer physics:
    - Neighbors continue to recognize the line
    - Cross the boundary under special conditions,
      * Now has a function that is not performed in virtue of sheer physics but in virtue of collective intentionality.
      * Primitive sense, symbolic;
        + Same function
        + Assigned a new status,
    - Seem a most natural and innocent de velopment, but it is momentous in its implications.
      * Human capacity for tool using.
      * But the truly radical break with other forms of life comes when humans, through collective intentionality, impose functions on phenomena
        + Requires continued human cooperation in the specific forms of recognition, acceptance, and acknowledgment of a new status
* Aim is to assimilate social reality to our basic ontology of physics, chemistry: and biology. To do this we need to show the continuous line that goes from molecules and mountains to screwdrivers, levers, and beautiful sunsets, and then to legisla tures, money, and nation-states.
  + Central span on the bridge physics to society is collective intentionality.
  + Entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition.
  + Structure is only incidentally related to the function ;
    - We do not allow people to perform the function of driving unless they have been authorized.
  + Special category on agentive functions, status functions.
    - The means by which it performs this function is the collective recognition
* Evolution of paper currency. Standard textbook accounts of money identify three kinds:
  + Commodity money,
    - such as gold, is regarded as valuable, and hence as money,because the commodity itself is regarded as valuable;
  + Contract money
    - Promissory notes to pay the bearer in valuable commodities
  + Fiat Money
    - Declared to be valuable as money by some official agency
  + Is not what the relationship among these three is, or even what fact about all three makes it the case that they are all money
    - Commodity money Is a medium of exchange because it is valuable; in the case of fiat money, it is valuable because it is a medium of exchange.
    - Illustrate certain logical relations, which do not depend on its historical accuracy.
      * Of barter, because the form that the money takes is regarded as itself valuable.
      * Solely because of its physical nature, which will typically already have some function imposed on it.
      * We impose the function of “value on the substance gold because we desire to possess
      * Are willing to accept
        + We thus have a system of exchange
        + May have no interest in them or use for them,
  + The certificate was a kind of substitute for the gold. It had complete credibility as an object of value, because at any point, it was exchangeable for gold. Commodity money had been replaced by contract money
    - As long as they have a collectively imposed function that continues to be collectively accepted, she certificates are, as they as good as gold.
    - Next stroke of genius came when somebody figured out-and it took a long time for people to figure this out-we can forget about the gold and just have the certificates.

### Constitutive Rules: X counts as Y In C

* We can better understand what is going on in the evolution of money if we explore the relation of constitutive rules to the creation of institutional facts.
  + Counts as” locution names a feature of the imposition of a statu s to which a function is attached by way of collective intentionality,
    - Accompanying function go beyond the sheer brute physical functions that can be assigned to physical objects
  + Rule” does not add anything but a label, so it is not a constitutive rule.
  + We say that such and such bits of paper count as money, we genuinely have a constitutive rule, because satisfying the X term, “such and such bits of paper,” is not by itself sufficient for being money, nor does the X term specify causal features that would be sufficient to enable the stuff to function as money without human agreement.
    - Y term has to assign a new status that the object does not already haves just in of satisfying the X term; and there has to be collective agreement, or at least acceptance, both in the imposition of that status
    - Status and its attendant functions have to be the sort of things that can be constituted by collective agreement or acceptance,
    - Continued collective acceptance or recognition of validity of the assigned function; otherwise the function canbe successfully performed.
  + It is not enough, for example, that we agree with the original assignment, “This stuff is money”; we must continue to accept it as money or it will become worthless.
* Derives from the nonphysical, noncausal character of the relation of the X and Y terms in the structure where we simply count X things as Y things
  + “But is an X really a Y?”
    - * Really money? Private Property? Getting married? Statement or promise?
        + Surely when you get down to brass tacks, these are not real facts.
        + We do not have any metaphysical doubts

Sheer physical features of the objects

* Simply describing the structure whereby institutional reality actually works in real human societies.
  + Satisfy certain conditions that constitute satisfying the X term.
    - Particular material ingredients,
    - Match a certain set of patterns
    - “Money” does more than provide a shorthand label for the features of the X term; it describes a new status, and that status, viz. Money, has a set of functions attached to it,
      * Paper counts as “legal tender for all debts public and private.”
  + Collective intentionality assigns a new status to some phenomenon, where that status has an accompanying function t
    - Institutional fact, a new fact created by human agreement.
  + The form of the assignment new status function can be represented by the formula “X counts as Y in C.
    - Agree to count the object named by the X term as having the status and function specified by the Y term.
    - Limited by the possibilities o
    - Guaranteed simply by collective agreement or acceptance.
      * Perhaps, the most mysterious feature of institutional facts, .
  + Process of the creation of institutional facts may progress without the participants being conscious that it is happening according to this form.
    - They need not think, “We are collectively imposing a value on something that we do not regard as valuable because of its purely physical features,” even though that exactly what they are doing.
      * We simply grow up in a culture where we take institution for granted. We need not be consciously aware of its ontology.
      * The form of the collective intentionality by which they are imposing functions on objects.
      * Evolve institutional facts
    - As long as people continue to recognize the X as having the Y status function, the institutional fact is created and maintained.
    - Other false beliefs »
  + Becomes a matter of general policy, the formula acquires a normative status. It becomes a constitutive rule.
    - The general rule creates the possibility of abuses that not exist without the rule, such as counterfeit money
    - Hyperinflation (too much money is issued, so that the ob jects satisfying the X term can no longer perform the function specified by the Y term).
  + The relation of rule and convention, at least in this case, is reasonably clear.
    - Which objects perform this function is a matter of convention.
    - Which shape to impose those powers o nis a matter of convention. The conditions laid down bY the X term are only incidentally related to the function specified by the Y term.
    - The selection of the X term is more or less arbitrary;   
       The features necessary for the ap- E plicability of the X term are essential to the performance of the Y term.
      * The authorization to perform surgery (Y term) has to be based on meeting certain medical criteria (X term)
    - It might seem that there are obvious counterexamples
      * A state governor declares an earthquake or a major fire to “disaster”
        + Earthquake or fire are sufficient to qualify them as disasters in of their physical features.
        + The function of a declared disaster is that the local victims qualify for such things as financial aid and low-interest loans, whereas fires and earthquakes by themselves do not generate money in virtue of their brute features and consequences.
      * Criminal law is regulative, not constitutive.
      * X term is chosen precisely because it is supposed to have the features necessary to perform the function specified by the Y term.
    - Collective agreement about the possession of the status is constitutive of having the status, and having the status is essential to the performance of the function assigned to that status.
      * both a causal agentive function and correlated status function
  + A special relation between the imposition of these status-functions and language.
    - Partly constitutive of the fact created.
    - The linguistically expressed concepts, such as “mony,” : ar now parts of the very facts we have created.

### Why Self-Referentiality Does Not Result in Circularity

* Infinite regress in any attempt to define the word, or even give an explanation of the concept of money?
  + Resolution of the paradox is quite simple. The word “money” marks one node a whole network of practices, the practices of owning, buying selling, earning, paying for services, paying off debts, etc.
    - As long as the object is regarded as having that role in the practices, we do not actually need the word “money
    - A placeholder for the linguistic articulation of all these practices.
  + The fact that a set of attitudes is partly constitutive of the truth conditions of a certain concept,
    - Does not have the consequence that the word expressing that concept cannot be defined without circularity or infinite regress. Thus we avoided the vicious circularity only by expanding the circle by including other institutional concepts
    - concept as applied to types and as applied to tokens.
      * A particular token could be mony even on thought it was money.
      * Has to do with codification.
      * An “official” form,
      * If it is informal, uncodified, then self-referentiality applies to each token. Immediate onsequence of the nature of agentive functions. It is not peculiar institutional facts.
      * Satisfying a description is being thought to satisfy that description

### Of Performative Utterances in the Creation of Institutional Facts

* You can perform those acts by You are performing them.
* Wrong person or in the wrong circumstances will have no such effect.
* Not empirical claim. they are declaring it
  + Does hold for every institutional fact.

### The Logical Priority or Brute Facts over Institutional Facts

* Structure of hierarchies to bottom out in phenomena whose existence is not a matter of human agreement.
  + Where there is a status-function imposed on something, there has to be something it is imposed on
  + No institutional acts without brut acts.
  + In order that some facts be institutional, there must be some other facts that are brute.

### Systematic Relations and the Primacy of the Act over the Object

* Systematic relations among institutional facts?
  + The facts in question are designed for precisely that purpose.
* Social objects, such as governments, money, and universities, are in fact just placeholders for patterns of activities.
  + The whole operation of agentive functions and collective intentionality is a matter of ongoing activities and the creation of the possibility of more ongoing activities.
  + The imposition of status-functions on these objects creates a level description of the object where it is an institutional object,
  + Function is manifested only in act transactions; hence, our interest is not in the object but in the processes and events where the functions are manifested.
* Priority of process over product
* Institutions are not worn by continued use, but each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution.
* Continued collective intentional of the users,

## Language and Social Reality

* Language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality
* Impossible to have institutional structures without some form of language because, in
  + Words or other symbols are
  + Prelinguistic animals can have all sorts of cooperative behavior, human infants are clearly capable of interacting socially in quite complex ways without any words.
  + If institutional facts require language and language is itself an institution, then it seems language must require language, and we have either infinite regress or circularity.
    - A weaker and a stronger version of my claim
      * Must have at least a primitive form of a language,
        + Institution of language is logically prior to other institutions.
      * Requires linguistic elements of the facts within that very” institution.
        + Believe both claims are true, and 1 will be arguing for stronger claim. The stronger claim implies the weaker.

### Language Dependent Thoughts and Language Dependent Facts

* Make explicit which features of language relevant to this issue.
  + Not attempt to define “language”
  + Essential for the constitution of institutional facts is the existence of symbolic devices, such as words, that bY convention or represent or symbolize something beyond themselves.
  + Institutional facts essentially contain some symbolic elements in this sense of “symbolic”
    - Conventional devices that mean something or express something or represent or symbolize something beyond themselves, in a way that is publicly understandable. 1
  + Representational or symbolic capacities by convention.
    - The actual feeling of hunger is not part of language because it represents its conditions of satisfaction intrinsically.
    - You do not need language to feel hungry.
* Distinguish between language-independent such as the fact that Mt. Everest has snow and ice at the summit and language-dependent facts, such as the fact that “Mt. Ever has snow and ice at the summit
  + Take away all language
  + Between language-dependent and language-independent thoughts.
    - The animal did not have words or some other linguistic devices for thinking that very thought,
    - Noninstitutional, primitive, biological inclinations and cognitions not requiring any linguistic devices..
      * Desires are intentional states with full intentional contents;
        + “Propositional attitudes.”
        + Fam the belie:
        + Prelinguistic thoughts are emotions such as fear and rage.
        + Not words nor are they composed of words?
* Mental representations, such as thoughts, must be partly constitutive of the fact; and second, the representations in question must be language dependent.
  + Status function specified by the Y term can be fulfilled only if it is recognized, accepted, acknowledged, or otherwise believed in, it follows that the institutional fact in question can exist if it is represented as existing. Ask
  + Mental representations as partly constitutive of these facts
  + Ontologically subjective, even though in general they are epistemically objective.
* A fact could contain mental states as constitutive features and still not be linguistic.
  + Suppose we arbitrarily create a word “dogbone” to mean a bone desired by at least one dog. T
* Why do I still have to have some words or wordlike elements to think the thoughts?
  + It can derive only from the character of the move from Ywhen we count some X as having the status-function named the Y term -
  + The answer, in short, must come from an understanding of the nature of status-functions.

### Why Are Any Thoughts Language Dependent?

* The thoughts that are constitutive of institutional facts are language dependent. But why?
  + Some thoughts are of such complexity that it would be empirically impossible to think them without being in possession of symbols.
    - Mathematical thoughts,
    - Involves language as a matter of logical necessity,
    - Definite set of words.
    - The content of the thought locates a day in relation to a specific verbal system
  + Reference, different sense.
* The thought is language dependent because the corresponding fact is language dependent.
  + The features in virtue of which it is a dog are features that independently of language.
  + A matter of its relation to a verbal system. If there were verbal system, there would be no such fact
    - Thought is language dependent because part of the content of the thought is that this day satisfies conditions that only relative to words.
    - No new status-function is carried by the label.

Games and Institutional Reality

* The case of points scored in a game
  + Points can exist only relative to a linguistic system for representing and counting points, and thus we can think about points only if we are in possession of the linguistic apparatus necessary for such a system.
  + Why can points exist only relative to such a linguistic system?
    - If you take the symbolic devices for representing points, there is nothing else there. Is just the system for representing and counting points.
    - Words consequences.
    - Would not try for mere words, because the points d etermine victory and defeat, and thus ar occasion of emotion ranging from ecstasy to despair.
      * They symbolize something beyond themselves, so by convention, and they are public.
    - Ar no prelinguistic perceptions of points, nor prelinguistic blis about points, because there is nothing there to perceive or have beliefs about except the relevant symbolic devices.
* There are words and other expressions, these have senses or meanings, and in virtue of these senses they have referents
  + Detach the sense or meaning from the expression and Just think
    - Seems we must always be able to dethe meaning because we can translate the expression into languages,
      * Translatability seems to prove that there detachable, thinkable sense that can attach now to English German words,
      * Such things as thoughts that are thoughts that are necessarily independent,
      * Imply that the thinkable sense is always detachable from speakable or writable expression.
  + Points are not “out there” in the way th at planets, men, balls, and lines are out there. Design of status-functions is such they both are partly constituted by thoughts and that prelinguistic forms of thought are inadequate to do the job.
    - Agent must have some way to represent the new status. H
      * He can’t get from thoughts just about the color and the shape of the dollar bill to the status “money” any more than he can can get from thoughts just about the movement of the man with the ball to the status “touchdown, six points.” Because the new status exists only convention, there must be some conventional way to represent status or the system will not
    - Words at all are logically necessary to treat and use an object as a screwdriver because its ability to function is a matter of its brute physical structure. But in the case of status functions, there is no structural feature of the X element sufficient itself to determine the Y function.
* Deontic status of institutional phenomena.
  + Phenomena that they create reasons for action that are independent of what you or I or anyone else is otherwise inclined to do.
    - The right to buy
* Could there be any institutional facts that are not language dependent, genuine facts Satisfying – formula, X accounts as Y,
  + where the Y term imposes a new status by collective intentionality, but where the intentionality in question is not language dependent?
  + The move that imposes the Y function on the X object is a symbolizing move.

### Does Language Require Language?

* Some conventional way for the participants in the institution to mark the fact that the X element now has the Y status.
  + Status confers deontic properties that are not physical properties, the status cannot exist without mark: ers. Those markers are now partly constitutive of the status.
  + Not an epistemic but an ontological point.
    - There is nothing in the physical relations between me and a piece of land that makes it my property. There is nothing in chemical composition of this piece of paper that makes it a dollar bill.
* It is also true that there is nothing in the acoustics the sounds that come out of my mouth or the physics of the marks that I make on paper that makes them into words or other sorts of symbols.
  + Language is precisely designed to be a self-identifying category of institutional facts.
  + Child is brought up in a culture where she learns to treat the sounds that come out of her own and others’ mouths as standing for, or meaning something, or representing something.
* The move from the brute to the institutional status is eo ipso linguistic move, because the X term now symbolizes something beyond itself.
  + There must be a vehicle of the thought.
  + Thinkable.
* Conventional markers that are not words but function just like words.
  + Kings wore crowns, husbands and wives wear wedding rings, cattle are branded, and lots of people wear unimarkers of their status.
* The capacity to attach a sense, a symbolic function, to an object that does not have that intrinsically is the precondition not only of language but of institutional reality:
* Condition of possibility of the creation of all human institu
  + The creation of a speech act is the creation of something with further representational capacities,
  + Semantic properties.
* Typically the “stands for” relation requires the existence of object that exists independently of the symbol that stands for it, but in the case of institutional reality at the lowest level. Ne practice of attaching a sense to an object according to the constitutive rules creates the very category of potential referents.
  + Symbols do not create cats and dogs and evening stars; they create the possibility of referring to cats, dogs, and evening stars in publicly accessible way
  + Symbolization creates the very ontological categories of money, property, points scored in games and
* The practice of using pieces of paper as dollar bills creates a class of entities that cannot exist without the practice.

### Other Functions of Language in Institutional Facts

* Other reasons why institutional facts require language.
  + Language is epistemically indispensable.
    - You cannot read off the function or status from the physics. You need labels.
  + The facts in question, being inherently social, must be communicable.
    - From one person to another, even when invisible to the naked eye.
  + In real life the phenomena in question are extremely complex, and the representation of such complex information requires language.
  + The facts in question persist through time independently of the duration of the urges and inclinations of the participants in the institution ..

## The General Theory of Institutional Facts part I: Iteration, Interaction, and Logical Structure

* Special role of language in institutional reality.
  + Will us the tools we have assembled to give an account that describes the structure
    - Simplicity of the story about money. To generalize the account
* “X counts as Y in C” can be iterated.
  + Impose status-functions on entities
  + X term at a higher level can be a Y term from an earlier level
  + A context that requires a previously imposed status-function.
  + On entities whose previously imposed status-function was that of representing, i.e we can impose them on speech acts
    - It is no exaggeration say that these iterations provide the logical structure of complex societies.
* Interlocking systems of such iterated structures operating through time.
  + The structures of iterated status-functions do not just exist at instantaneous moments.
    - Interact constantly
    - All presuppose systems of constitutive rules operating through time.
  + Why is it not enough that I possess this in the sense that X have physical control over it and why is it not enough that we just live together?
    - Of us think we are better off if there a system of collectively recognized rights, responsibilities, obligations, and powers added onto-and in the end able to substitute for-brute physical possession and cohabitation.
      * More stable system of expectations
      * We don’t have to rely brute physical force to sustain the arrangements;
      * Maintain the arrangements even in the absence of the original physical setup.
* Often the function is imposed by way of performing explicit speech acts.
  + Context the ceremony creates a new institutional entity.
  + It is a consequence of the account that there will a hierarchical structure of the creation of a large number of institutional facts.
    - Making a promise
    - as entering into a contract,
* On what exactly are the status-functions imposed and what exactly are the imposed status-functions?
  + Carry specific rights and obligations.
  + Performance is yet another institu tional fact.
  + Distinction between real property and personal property.
    - Between “meuble” and “immeuble” reveals precisely this distinction.
      * Movable property often also has status indicators-for registration papers for cars and brands for cattle.
    - Property is very valuable,
      * It is not easily identifiable and can wander away, as in case of cattle; or it carries responsibility for possible harm as the case of guns; or
      * It is hard to see how there could be a system of complex real property ownership without documentation.
* Top of the brute physical possession material objects
  + Build a structure of buying and selling, of bequeathing, partial transfer, mortgaging, etc., of property
    - Usually called legal “instruments.”
      * Records the fact
      * Speech acts, that of transferring ownership
      * Intellectual feat, we must have what I have called status indicators
* Governments have their origin in a series of primitive biological phenomena,
  + status hierarchies, leadership
    - Brute physical force
      * Essential to understanding political philosophy
  + Elaborate structures that are then
    - Evolve as institutional structures way of the collective imposition of status-functions on top of the more primitive relationships
    - All sorts of substances can serve as money; objects need only meet certain minimum conditions of durability, handleability, transportability, noncounterfeitability, recognizability, and perhaps a few others perform the functions of money.
      * Not arbitrarily related to
      * Not matters of necessity either.
  + Because of this slack between the conditions specified by the X term and the function specified by the Y term, cultures differ in the qualifications they require for the performance of the same or similar functions.
    - Defined in terms of its origin and structure:

### Codification

* A test for the presence of genuine institutional facts is whether or we could codify the rules explicitly.
  + Explicit laws. Others, such as friendship, dates, and cocktail parties, are not so codified,
    - Explicit codification has its price. It deprives us of the flexibility, spontaneity, and informality that the practice has in its uncodified form.
    - A sharp dividing line between social facts in transition and not a snair- v
      * Label assigns no new status. Functions. It just labels the intentionality and its manifestation
      * Phenomenon of a higher sort by imposing a collective status and a corresponding function upon it.
* “War” thus oscillates between naming a type of large-scale social fact and a type of institutional fact. The
  + War as social fact can exist no matter how it came about,
    - Under the U.S. Constitution, war as an institutional fact exists only if it is created by an act of Congress, a type of speech act call a Declaration.

### Some Of the Issues at Stake in the Analysis

* Sorts of facts can create simply by collective agreement to count an X as having status Y?
  + What are the possibilities and limitations of institutional facts?
  + It would seem a priori that there is not much we could do with it, and it all looks very fragile, as if the whole system might just collapse at any time.
  + Can “organized society” have a “logical structure”?
    - Society is not a set of propositions or a theory, so what is this talk of logical structure? On
    - Not only mental representations but even linguistic representations, as constitutive elements.
  + Structures as property and the state itself are maintained by the armed police and military power of the state, that acceptance will be compelled where necessary.
    - Usable only against very small numbers, and even then on the assumption that nearly everyone else accepts the systems of status-functions.
    - Put on a ceremonial show
    - In many democratic societies, once the number of lawbreakers reaches critical mass, the police force is largely for show.
* Cannot assume the system of acceptance is backed by a credible system of forces.
  + State of nature is precisely one in which people do in fact accept systems of constitutive rules, at least nearly all the time.
  + When the system of status functions was no longer accepted.
    - Indigenous police and military unwilling to attempt to maintain the system.
  + It is tempting to some to that there must be some rational basis for such acknowledgment, that the participants derive some game theoretical advanor get on a higher indifference curve,
    - Emarkable feature of institutional structures is that people continue to acknowledge and cooperate in many of them even when it is by no means obviously to their advantage to do so.
      * Maintained largely by habit, they can also collapse quite suddenly, as when people lose confidence in their currency or to recognize their government as a government.
      * Marx, all history is the history of class struggle.
        + The surprising thing is how little of history is about class struggles.

National loyalties proved much more powerful than class solidarity,

Counted for next to nothing. And in most of these great upheavals, the systems of constitutive rules that sustained the class distinctions were preserved, even though all sorts of other institutional changes took place

* + - There is no simple set of | elations among motivation, self-interest, institutional structure, institutional change.
* Human rights. Prior to the European Enlightenment the concept of rights had application only within some institutional structure
  + Somehow the idea came to be collectively accepted
  + Aided bY the idea of divine authority:
  + Has survived the decline of religious belief, and has even become internationalized.
* Matters of power relations
  + Makes a certain type of liberal sensibility very nervous. A certain class of intellectuals would rather that power did not exist all
    - Everything we value in civilization requires the creation maintenance of institutional power
    - Require constant monitorand adjusting to create and preserve fairness, efficiency. Flexibility, and creativity, not to mention such traditional values as flexibility, and creativity, not ubiquitous and essential.
      * -massive, pervasive and typically invisible
      * As such it is not a threat to liberal values but rather the precondition of their existence.

### Some Types of Imposition of Status-Functions

* What sorts of new facts, new powers, new causal structures can people create by creating status-functions, when I; status-functions exist only because they are believed to exist?
  + Improvements in technology do not the possibilities. We
  + “Counts as” locution specifies a form of intentionality.
    - Limited by the possibilities of imposing new features on entities just by collectively agreeing that they have those features.
    - A very few general formal properties of institutional facts.
    - A matter of conferring some new power.
    - Language enable the bearer or user to do things
      * Form of creation of power such as authorization, permission, enablement
        + Negation or conditionalization
* Acceptance of the power is constitutive of having it.
  + Places no restrictions on subject matter so the enormous variety institutional reality,
  + Does not require that the participants be aware of what is actually happening.
* Imposition of status-functions on objects and events works only in relation to people.
  + It is not object that matters, but rather that the possessor of the five dollar bill now has a certain power that
  + Usual distinction between the internal and the external points of view applies
    - It is only from the internal point of view of the participants that the institution can exist at all.
    - Whether conscious or unconscious, can exist only from the internal firstperson point of view.
      * Microlevel
        + As a medium of exchange and store of value
      * A macrolevel
        + The institutions as having different functions,
    - The internal microlevel is ontologically primary.
      * Categories, which I call Symbolic, Deontic, Honorific, and Procedural.
* Symbolic Powers: The Creation of Meaning
  + Enable us to represent reality in one or more of the possible illocutionary modes.
  + Physical structure determines both a formal structure-the syntax-and a meaningful content-the semantics.
    - Cannot impose rights, obligations, etc. without words or symbols.
* Deontic Powers: The Creation of Rights and Obligations
  + Regulate relations bes- | tween people.
  + Two broad categories
    - The agent is endowed
    - Where the agent is required, obligated, in duty bound, penalized, enjoined, or otherwise compelled to do something he she would not otherwise have had to
  + Conventional power.
    - Often the point of giving conventional power is to authorize the use of brute physical convex
  + Categorization of institutional reality is between what agent can do and what the agent must (and must not) do, tween what the agent is enabled to do and what he or she is re quired to do as a result
* Honor: Status for Its Own Sake
  + Rather than just for their further consequences.
* Procedural Steps on the Way to Power and Honor
  + Procedural steps on the way to winning, but you can’t do anything else with them.
* One and the same institutional fact can involve all four of the preceding features.
  + Could not exist without words.
  + Games are especially useful objects of study
    - Certain obstacles that have been created for the purpose of trying overcome them.

The Logical Structure of Conventional Power

* Examine the intentional structure
* Propositional content of power
* Distinction between the initial creation and the subsequent maintenance of an institutional fact.
  + Collectively grant and restrict powers
* In classic deontic logic the absence of the obligatoriness not to do something is equivalent to the permissibility of doing it; but there is no such obvious equivalence for conventional powers, because there are of things that I am not required not do to (i.e., they are not for ɔidden), but I have not been institutionally authorized or enabled do them.
* There is a deep point implicit in this about the nature of conventional powers: They exist only where there is some act or process of creation.
* Everything turns out to be deontic.
  + When the antecedent of the ditional is fulfilled, the result is an upward step in the iterated hierarchy of institutional reality.
* Zero really number? Or, Is the null class really a class?

Question asks not for a matter of fact but for a decision,

### Conclusion

* There is exactly primitive logical operation by which institutional reality is created and constituted. It has this form:
  + We accept (S has power (S does A)).
* Satisfying the antecedent of the conditional automatically raises the structure to a higher level of iterated status-functions, where conventional power becomes manifest.
  + We accept (S is out) iff We accept (S is required (S leaves the Held)
* The end all features cash out in terms of conventional powers, and con ventional powers are variations on and iterations of the basic structure. ¥
  + Enormous complexity of the body of institutional reality has a rather simple skeletal structure.

## The General Theory of Institutional Facts Part II. Creation, Maintenance, and the Hierarchy

* State a general theory of the creation, maintenance, identification of institutional facts.
  + Four elements: the institution, its use in the creation of facts, their continued existence, and their indication.
    - The institution that permits definitionally implicit
    - A whole range of functions, rather than a single specific function,
* Do not intend to endorse any sort of “functional analysis” or “functional explanations” in sociological investigation.
  + The functions I am discussing are internally related to the corresponding status,
* Often, though not always, involve explicit performative declarations,

### The Creation of Institutional Facts

* Where the institutional structures already guarantee that certain lower-level actions count as higher-level institutional phenomena.
  + Games and speech acts.
  + In a particular context i appropriate circumstances ,
  + The complex require that certain types of institutional facts be created by acts whose performances are themselves institutional facts.
* An election the individual expressions of preference of the voters count as voting in an election.
  + Institutional that typically require speech acts for their creation may also come to exist without any speech act, simply by a social fact persisting over a period of time. A “common law marriage”

### Continued Existence of Institutional Facts

* Relevant community must continue to recognize and accept the existence of such facts.
* One of the most fascinating-and terrifying-features of the era in which I write this is the steady erosion of acceptance of era in which I write this is the steady erosion of
  + Breakdown of national identification in favor of ethnic tribalism occurs
  + The relations among the state, the military, secret police, and organized crime, for example-is likely to be out of date by the time you read this.
  + It all depends on who has the most armed might, that brute facts will always prevail over institutional facts. But that is not really true
    - Of the great illusions of the era is that “Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” In fact power grows out of organizations, i.e. systematic arrangements of status-functions.
* Elaborate apparatus of prestige and honor is invoked to secure recognition and maintain acceptance.
  + Way to create institutional facts in situations where the institution does not exist is simply to act as if it did exist. “
  + The existence of the fact is constituted by its having been created and not yet destroyed

### Status Indicators

* Require official representations, wh
* The signature on the document persists in a way that the live performative does not and thus is able to play role as a status indicator
  + The function of status indicators is always epistemic.
    - Need not be explicitly linguistic,
    - In institutional facts language is not only descriptive but constitutive of reality.

### Hierarchy of Facts: From Brute to Institutional

* The world of institutions is part of the “physical” world.
  + Figure 5.1 Hierarchical Taxonomy of (Certain Types of) Facts
    - -Functions are always ultimately assigned to brute phenomena, hence the line from Assignment of Function to Brute physical Facts.
* Non mental brute facts
* Intentional facts, such as the fact that I now want a drink water, and nonintentional facts, such as the fact that I am now pain.
* Singular intentional facts, such as the fact that I now want a drink of water, and collective intentional facts, such as the fact that those hyenas are attacking a lion.
  + Institutional facts are then special subclass of social facts, and our problem has been to specify exactly the features that define this subclass.
* Forms of intentionality that assign a function, creates functional facts.
  + Species of mental fact, that it is ontologically subjective from the observer-relative character of all functional attributions.
* Nonagentive functional facts, e.g., the function of the heart is to pump blood, and agentive functional facts, e.g., the function of hammers is to drive nails.
  + Imposed functions are assigned not only to artifacts but also to natural phenomena.
  + The discovery of latent functions of institutions is the discovery of a nonagentive function of an artifact.
* Functions performed solely in virtue of causal other brute features of the phenomena and functions per only by way of collective acceptance.
  + Comprise a subcategory of agentive functions.
* Classifying institutional
  + By subject matter. We distinguish among linguistic, economic, political, religious, etc., institutional facts.
  + By temporal status
* We can iterate functions on top of functions
  + Produce the highest levels of institutional facts.

### Institutional Facts and the Background of Capacities

* Except for special cases where legislation is passed or the author ities change the rules of a game,
  + Typically a matter of natural evolution.
* Money gradually evolves in ways that we are not aware of.
  + Some cases involve explicit intention but that seems to me only one type of case.
  + The presuppositions of the use of entities that have a function are often in the form of Background phenomena that are simply taken for granted.
* Subsequent generations are simply brought up in a culture containing screwdrivers and hammers
  + They never think about the imposition of collective intentionality;

## Background Abilities and the Explanation of Social Phenomena

### Constitutive Rules and Causation

* People who are participating in the institutions are typically not conscious of these rules;
  + Often they even have false beliefs
  + Even the very people who created the institution may be unaware of its structure.
    - Not conscious of the rules and do not appear to be trying to follow them, either consciously or unconsciously, and if indeed the very people who created or participated the evolution of the institution may themselves have been totally ignorant of the system of rules, then what causal role could the rules play?
    - Standard answer in the literature of cognitive science and linguistics.
      * Of course we are following these rules, but we do so unconsciously. Indeed, in many cases the rules are not even the sort of rules that we could be con cases the
      * Chomsky, rules of a Universal Grammar,
        + Rules are so deeply unconscious that there is no way that a child could be conscious of them

Common in cognitive science.

I am very dissatisfied with these accounts.

* + - * Since Freud we have found it useful and convenient to speak glibly about the unconscious mind without paying the price of explaining exactly what we mean
        + Just like conscious states only minus the consciousness.
        + Most appeals to the unconscious in CogScience we really have no clear idea what we are talking about.
  + Have to appeal the notion that I have elsewhere called “the Background.”
    - How it works; in the second will apply the principles stated

### What Is the Background and How Does It Work?

* The thesis of the Background: Intentional states function only given a set of Background capacities that do not themselves consist in intentional phenomena.
  + Beliefs, desires, and rules only determine conditions of satisfaction
  + The set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states of function.
    - By capacities I mean abilities, dispositions, tendencies, and causal structures generally. It
      * Not know how these structures function at a neurophysiological level, we are forced to describe them at a much higher level.
    - Enabling is meant, then, to be a causal notion
      * Logical structures that function causally in the production
    - Intentional states:
      * All intentional states are either actually or potentially conscious are sound
      * Conscious forms of intentionality
    - Function: types of functioning
  + Literal meaning of any sentence can only determine its truth conditions or other conditions of satisfaction against a Background of capacities, dispositions, know-how, etc.,
    - Which are not themselves part of the semantic content of the sentence.
      * Sentences containing simple English verbs like “cut,
        + Lexical ambiguity or metaphorical usage involved. But in each case the same verb will determine different truth conditions or conditions of satisfaction generally, because what counts. Cutting or growing will vary with the context. I
* The phenomenon is pervasive.
  + “She gave him her key and he opened the door.”
    - Whether when speaker utters that sentence it is actually said (or merely implied) that he opened the door with that key,
  + There is a certain underdetermination of what is said by literal meaning of this sentence. I
    - A radical underdetermination of is said by the literal meaning of the sentence,
  + It to your imagination produce an indefinite range i ridiculous but still literal interpretations
* Can be extended from semantic contents to intentional contents generally. Any
* Believe Hume was the first philosopher to recognize the centrality of the Background in explaining human cognition, and Nietzsche was the philosopher impressed by its radical contingency
  + Nietzsche saw, with anxiety, that the Background does not have to be the way it is.
* The Background enables linguistic interpretation to take place.
* We don’t interpret the sentences at level of bare semantic content; interpretation rises to the level our Background abilities. We immediately and effortlessly finterpret these sentences in the stereotypical appropriate way.
  + Enables perceptual interpretation to lace.
* Are able to see things as certain sorts of things.
  + We bring to bear on the raw perceptual stimulus a set of Background skill s;
    - The ability to apply certain categories.
    - For perception: in general. I
* Structures consciousness.
  + All nonpathological forms of consciousness are experienced under the spect of familiarity.
  + Because all intentionality is aspectual, all conscious in tentionality is aspectual; and the possibility of perceiving, that is, the possibility of experiencing under aspects requires a familiarity the set of categories under which one experiences those aspects.
    - Ability to apply those categories is a Background ability
  + Normally just see an object or understand a sentence, without any act of interpreting It
  + Notice the sheer intellectual effort it takes to break with our Background. Surrealist painters tried to do this, but eve
* Temporally extended sequences of experiences corne to us with a narrative or dramatic shape.
  + Not only an episodic applica on 4 dynamic application over a series of sucevents.
  + They get from television, movies, and reading is, of course, in part a set of beliefs and desires. The point at present, however, is that beliefs desires only fix conditions of satisfaction against a Background of capacities that are not themselves beliefs or desires
  + Extend over sequences of events and structure those sequences into narrative shapes.
* Of us has a set of motivational dispositions, and these will condition the structure of our experiences.
  + Will experience the streets of Paris or New York in a different way from the person who is obsessed by loud formations and Arizona cactus
* Facilitate certain kinds of readiness.
  + At any given point I am ready for certain things and not other things -
    - When I am giving a lecture am not at all ready for a skier to come skiing through the lecture
    - Comedy is based on just such incongruities.
* Disposes me to certain sorts of behavior.
  + Manifestations of the Background.

### Background Causation

* How can it be that the rules of the institution play a role in our dealings with the institution, even we are not following the rules either consciously or unconsciously?
  + Just know what to do. I know what the appropriate behavior is, without reference to the rules.
* Role do the rules of baseball play in this explanation?
  + Appropriate to the beginner. Unless there is some dispute, rules of baseball don’t concern the expert at all;
  + Woman takes her shopping list to the supermarket. The list is an explicit statement of a set of desires, and in
    - Dealing with money
    - We want to say that in addition to the desire items she is buying, she has a desire to follow the constitutive rules of money or that she is unconsciously following the constitutive rules of money
      * Those claims implausible. And that implausibility leads me to the questions I am now trying to pose.
* Intentionalistic explanation is appropriate, where, for example, we have rational decision making in behavior.
* Decision theoretic models of rationality \_
  + not satisfactory at all.
  + Consequence of Bayesian decision theory that if you value any two things, there must be some odds at which you would bet one against the other.
    - Usually half an hour of argument, they say, “You are simply irrational.” I do not think so
      * Conception of rationality as a set of specific, well-defined operations over sharply delineated, explicit intentional contents is inadequate.
* Causal explanation that is common in the social sciences does not appeal to intentional contents but to brute physical causation.
  + Behaviorism was the prominent version of this type of explanation. 1
* Role of Background capacities for dealing with institutions?
  + How to distinguish between rule-described behavior and rule-governed behavior.
  + Rules do not have any reality except as a part of a theoretical description of phenomena.
    - Device the linguist uses
    - Just describe the behavior, they don’t actually play in causing it.
  + Unconscious internalization of the rules is actually acting causally to produce
* Intentionalistically, then we have abandoned the thesis of the Background.
  + So far. The intentionality is not self-interpreting
  + Wittgenstein often talks ungrounded way Of acting.s
  + Rule structure in the causal explanation of human behavior
    - Money seem to have a rule structure that walking does not seem to have
* Two competing paradigms in cognitive science. One is the paradigm of the traditional, von Neumann serial information processing
  + More recent development of parallel distributed processing, or neuronal net modeling, where there is meaningful input and a meaningful output, but in between there are no symbol-processing steps;
    - A series of nodes with different connection strengths between them, and signals pass from one node to another
      * eventually changes in the connection strengths give the right match of inputs and outputs, without any set of rules or logical principles in between.
  + Are the features of the internal structure that enable the systo produce a structured output that manifests compositional other logical properties?
  + Here is our paradox: We want a causal explanation that will explain the intricacy, the complexity, and the sensitivity of our behavior as well as explaining its spontaneity, creativity, and originality.
    - Whether it is connectionism or behaviorism, this type of causation does not have a rational structure.
* The Background can be causally sensitive to the specific forms of the constitutive rules of the institutions without actually containing any beliefs or desires or representations of rules.
  + Is not applying the rules more skillfully; rather, he has acquired a set of dispositions
  + Can evolve, a set of abilities that are sensitive to specific structures of intentionality without actually being constituted by that intentionality.
  + They have developed a set of dispositions that are sensitive and responsive to the specific content of those rules.
  + A reflection of the sets of constitutive rules whereby we impose functions
* Rules are never self interpreting, They are never exhaustive, fact in many situations, we just know what to do,
  + We develop skills that responsive to that particular institutional structure.
* Evolutionary biology we perform an inversion on that intentional or teleological explanation, where we substitute two levels of explanation.
  + First, the causal level: We say the fish has the shape that it because of its genetic structure, because of the way the genotype in response to the environment, produces the phenotype.
  + Second, the “functional” level: We say that fish that have that shape more likely to survive than fish that do not.
    - Survival still functions part of the explanation, but now it is introduced into the explanation diachronically
    - Is not a goal that is pursued but simply an effect that happens;
    - Capacities for coping with social phenomena.
    - Acquires a set of Background habits, skills, dispositions
* It is just wrong to assume, and certainly unsupported evidence that has been presented in the course of these discussions, that our behavior matches the structure of the rules because we are unconsciously following the rules.
  + As-if intentionality is as empty as Daniel Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’ 10 all of is precisely the sort of behaviorism you have been militating against.”
  + If you understand the complexity of the causation involved, You can see that often the person who behaves in a skillful way within an institution behaves as if he were following the rules, but not because is following the rules unconsciously nor
    - Urging the addition of another a diachronic level, in the explanation of certain sorts of social behavior.
    - Socially created normative component,
* Man who is chez lui in the social institutions of the society, is at home because he has mastered the rules of the society, but

## Does the Real World Exist? Part I: Attacks on Realism

* Have been presupposing that in general our statements when true correspond to facts, and it is now also time to defend this
  + About realism;
  + Contemporary commonsense scientific world

### Some Presuppositions of Our Contemporary World View

* A formal feature of our world view is the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity
  + Systematically ambiguous between an epistemic and an ontological sense.
    - The world (or alternatively, reality or the universe) exists independently of our representations of it. This view I will call “external realism.” I
    - Of interconnected ways of have access to and representing features of the world
      * Both intrinsic intentionality, as in beliefs and perceptions, and derived intentionality, as in maps and sentences.
    - Beliefs and statements, purport to be about and to represent how things are in re
      * True if and only if they correspond the facts in reality.
        + The correspondence theory of truths.
    - Vocabularies and conceptual schemes generally, are human creations,
      * Different systems of representations for representing the same reality.
        + “Conceptual relativity.
    - Efforts to get true representations of reality are influenced by all sorts of factors-cultural, economic, psychologand so on.
      * Complete epistemic objectivity is difficult, sometimes impossible, because actual investigations are always from a point of view,
    - Having true representations for which we can give certain sorts of justification or evidence. Knowledge is thus by definition objective in the epistemic sense,
  + Knowledge can be naturally classified by subject matter,
    - The claim that there is a reality independent representations (external realism) is not exactly equivalent to the claim that there is a reality completely independent of minds (ontological objectivity).
      * Some mental states, such as pains, are ontologically subjective, they are not representations.
      * Ontological objectivity implies external realism, because mind independence implies representation independence. But not conversely
      * If we have genuine knowledge, we have epistemic objectivity by definition.
  + Realism and the correspondence theory, respectively, are often confused with each other; worse yet, they are both often supposed to have been refuted.
    - Several philosophers that proposition 4, conceptual relativity, creates a problem realism;

### What Is Realism?

* There never been any representations-any statements, beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, etc.-most of the world would have remained unaffected.
  + Except for the little corner of the world that is constituted or affected by our representations, the world would still have existed and would have been exactly the same as it is now
  + It has the further consequence that when we all die, and all our representations die with us, most features of the world will remain totally unaffected; they will go on exactly as before.
  + Many language-independent features, facts, states of affairs, etc.
    - The world exists independently not only of language but also of thought, perception, belief, etc. point is that, in large part, reality does not depend on intentionality in any form.
* The metaphor of “external”
  + Holds that reality exists outside of, or external to, system of representation.
* Realism is not a theory of truth
  + It is a theory of ontology and not of the meaning of “true-” It is not a semantic theory at all
  + Misconception is to suppose that there is something epistemic about realism. \
    - Thus, for example, Hilary Putnam writes²
      * Eye view (or better a view from. nowhere).
  + The whole idea of a “view” is already epistemic and ER is not epistemic. It would be consistent with realism to supthat any kind of “view” of reality is quite impossible.
    - Kant’s doctrine of things in themselves is a conception of a reality that is inaccessible to any “view.” I
* An ontological theory: It says that there exists totally independent of our representations.
* Pervasive further ambiguity in the notion of realism that I need to expose and remove.
  + Typically Philosophers who discuss these issues treat them as if | concerned how the world is in fact. TheY think the issues between, say, realism and idealism are about the existence of matter or about objects in space and time.
    - Realism does not say how things are but that there is a way that they are. And ‘things”
* What if it should turn out that material objects do not exist or even that space and time do not exist
  + In a sense it already has turned out that way,
    - We now think of material objects as collections of “particles” that are not themselves material objects but are best thought of as points of mass/energy; absolute space and time have given way to sets of relations to coordinate systems.
    - It all presupposes realism. It presupposes that there is a way things are that is independent of how we represent how things are.
  + Suppose it should turn out that physical reality is causally dependent on consciousness in such
    - Ulat still be consistent with external on consciousness is a causal denendence like any other.
    - The claim is that reality is not logically constituted by representations, th at there is no logical dependence.
    - Even if it should turn out that the only actual reality is mental states.
* Exactly are the arguments for both assertion and denial?
  + Will look in vain for answers to these questions in most discussions of these matters. I carelessness is not accidental. It is somehow satisfying to our will to power to think that “we” make the world, that reality itself is but a social construct, alterable at will and subject to future changes as “we” see fit
  + General intellectual atmosphere that makes antirealist versions of “poststructuralism” such as deconstruction seem intellectually acceptable, even exciting.
    - Undisguised, they tend to look fairly ridiculous.
      * Obscurantism of many (not all) of these discussions.
* Maturana rejects the idea of “an objective reality” in favor of the idea that nervous systems, as autopoietic systems, construct their own reality.
  + Since we have no conception of, and no access reality except through the social construction of realities in the “consensual domains,” constructed by autopoietic systems, there is no reality existing independently of biological systems.

It does not follow that the reality of which we have knowledge/conception/picture is constructed by human brain human interactions.’ It is just a non sequitur, a genetic fallacy, to infer from the collective neurophysiological causal explanation f our knowledge of the external world to the nonexistence of the external world.

* + Winograd points out that the same sentence, e.g., “There is water in the refrigerator,” c can be used to make a false statement relative to one set of background interests, a true statement relative to another s
  + Representations of reality does not show that the reality represented is itself interest-relative.
  + George Levine writes, “Antirealism, even literary antirealism, depends on a sense of the impossibility of unmediated knowledge.”6
* What is one to do then, in the face of an array of weak or even nonexistent arguments for a conclusion that seems preposterous?
  + Conceptual relativity,
  + Verificationist argument,
  + Ding an sich argument.

### The Argument from Conceptual Relativity Against Realism

* System of classification or individuation of object; of categories for describing the world, indeed, any system representation at all is conventional, and to that extent arbitrary. The world divides up the way we divide it,
  + Always imagine alternative ystems of classification.
  + If “klurg” is a new con- new conwith previously unheard-of truth conditions, there is no limit how many new concepts we can form.
  + Characterized, conceptual relativism seems completely true, indeed, platitudinous.
    - Several philosophers have supthat it is inconsistent with external realism,
      * If we accept conceptual relativism, we are forced to deny realism.
* External realism be the view that: :
  + ER1: Reality exists independently of our representations of it.
  + Let the relevant thesis of conceptual relativism be the view that:
    - CR1: All representations of reality are made relative to some or less arbitrarily selected set of concepts.
* The same sentence, e.8- “There are exactly three objects in the world,” will be true in one scheme, false in the other. The
  + Leads to inconsistencies because it allows for inconsistent descriptions of the supposedly independently existing reality.
* Some of the examples of conceptual relativism given in the literature are more arcane and complicated than the ones I have given, but the principle they employ is the same, and I cannot see that anything is gained by the complexity
  + Cannot see that anything is gained bY the complexity:
  + Nothing in any of them that is inconsistent with external realism.
* Raised by Goodman,
  + Inconsistent descriptions made relative to different conceptual schemes?
    - Consider a case of how external realism deals with alternative vocabularies.
      * ‘What is my aim in philosophy? To teach you to turn disguised nonsense into obvious nonsense,”¹ 1
    - If conceptual relativity is to be used as an argument against realism, it seems to presuppose realism, because it presupposes a language-independent reality
  + “We make stars by drawing certain boundaries rather than others,”
    - Presupposing something there on which we can draw boundaries \_
* Commit a massive use-mention fallacy:
  + It does not follow that the facts/objects/states of affairs,/etc.,
    - Described can only exist relative to a set of categories.
  + Counts as a correct application of term “cat” or “kilogram” or “canyon” (or “klurg”) is up to us to decide and is to that extent arbitrary.
  + That we use the word “cat” the way we do is up to us; that there is an object that exists independently of that use, and satisfies that use, is a plain matter of (absolute, intrinsic, mind-independent) fact. Contrary to Goodman, we do not make “worlds”; we make descriptions
    - Implies that there is a reality that exists independently of our system of concepts
* True statements about the world can consistently be affirmed together. Indeed
  + Course, we are always confronted with the problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family resemblance, open texture, contextual dependency, the incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, the idealization involved in theory construction, alternative interpretations, the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and all the rest of it. But these features of our systems of representation, not of the representation-independent reality that some of these systems can be used, more less adequately, to represent.

### The Verificationist Argument

* The idea that nothing at all exists apart from language and meaning.
  + Experience and knowledge,
  + Basic philosophical motivation Behind verificationists’ arguments against realism is to try to eliminate the possibility of skepticism by removing the gulf between appearance and reality
  + If our experiences are somehow constitutive of reality, then the form of skepticism that says we can never get out of our experiences to the reality beyond is answered.
  + Kant’s transcendental idealism
    - Efforts to analyze meaning in “public” terms, or even “behavioristically,’
* Most powerful verificationists’ argument against realism:
  + Ask yourself what you really know, I mean really know.
    - About the world, the answer has to be: from Your experiences.
      * Simply report the content of Your experiences or they 0 beyond those contents.
        + Making claims that You cannot validate,
        + Because all validation rests on experience, and you are ex hypothesi making claims that go beyond what you experience.
  + (“sense data” in the twentieth century jargon, “ideas” and “impressions” in that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), or if something more is claimed, then it must be a claim about something totally unknowable and inaccessible to any investigation.
    - Claim is empirically empty. The conclusion is obvious: experience is constitutive of reality.
* Berkeley summarizes this argument neatly when he says, “If matter did exist we could never know it, if it does not exist every thing remains the same.
  + I might be deceived by an evil demon, I might be dreaming,
    - Even if skepticism is right, and I am systematically mistaken, what I am mistaken about are the features of the real world.
      * The only reality we can meaningfully speak of is the reality of perceptual experiences.
* Cartesian skepticism, in particular, were central to the entire philosophical enterprise. I regard these as mistakes. Epistemology has an important but certainly not a central place in the enterprise of philosophy.
  + Epistemological considerations could never, siderations of the sort that I have been discussing co these considerations, we have to presuppose realism.

### The Ding an Sich Argument

* Concerning things in themselves
  + There is no nonrepresentational standpoint which we can survey the relations between representation and reality,
    - There is not even the Possibility of assessing the adequacy of our representations by measur ing them against things in themselves,
    - Of a transcendent reality must be just so much nonsense
    - All the reality we can ever really get at, have access to, is the reality that is internal our system of representations.
  + A thing in itself, beyond the grasp not only of our knowledge but of our language and thought.
    - An unthinkable something, indescribable, inaccessible, unknowable, unspeakable, and ultimately nonsensical.
      * The real problem with such a realism is not that it is false, but that it is ultimately unintelligible.
* Simply does not folfrom the fact that all cognition is within a cognitive system that no cognition is ever directly of a reality that exists independently of all cognition.

### Diagnosis of the Problem

* One of the oldest urges in Western philosophy is to think that somehow or other truth and reality should coincide.
  + If there really were such things as truth and reality, as we normally think of them, then truth would have to provide an exact mirror of reality
    - Nature of reality itself would have to provide the exact structure of true statements
    - The naive external realist is committed to their coincidence.
    - . The aspectual character of all representations derives from such facts as that representation is always made from within a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view.
      * An indefinitely large number of different points of view,
      * Impossible to get the coincidence between truth and reality .
  + Is only from a point of view that we represent reality, but ontologically objective reality does not have a point of view.

## Does the Real World Exist? II: Could There Be a Proof of External Realism?

### Realism as a Background Condition of Intelligibility

* To provide an “argument” or “proof” already presupposes standards of rationality, because the applicability of those standards is constitutive of something’s being an argument or
  + Can’t prove rationality by argument because arguments already presuppose rationality. Demand to justify the framework from within the framework is always senseless and yet somehow see-ms incumbent upon us.
    - Grammatical or ungrammatical, because English sets the standard for grammaticality in English.
* One cannot in that way show that the claim that there is an external world corresponds to how things are in the external world, because any question of corresponding or failing to correspond to the external world already presupposes the existence of an external world to which the claim corresponds or fails to correspond.
  + External realism is thus not a thesis nor an hypothesis but the condition of having certain sorts of theses or hypotheses.
* Realism is that convergence in science provides a kind of empirical proof of realism.
* The entire discussion of convergence presupposes realism,
  + Social psy :hology, our recognition of the failure provides exactly as much evidence for realism as our recognition of those areas in which it does converge, i.e., it provides no evidence at all,
  + Genuine metatheory about the sociology of scientific research, a theory to the effect that, as a matter of second-order empirical fact, scientists working at different times and places tend to produce convergent results, results that agree from one lab to another, and that this convergence is confirming evidence for realism,
* Conclusion is a straight entailment relation:
* There are conditions on the intelligibility of discourse, and indeed on the functioning of intentionality in general, that are not like paradigmatic cases of truth conditions.
  + Unless we took them for granted, we could not understand utterances the way we do or even have the intentional states with conditions of satisfaction that we have.
  + Proved ipso facto the existence of external things
* We have to take ER for granted to in the sorts of discourse and thought that we have been engaging
* ER so construed is not an empirical thesis but rather a condition of intelligibility on having certain sorts of theses, then we can see that it has no special connection to the theory that there are “objects” in “space.
  + A way that things are that is independent of all repre sentations of how things are.
    - Thesis that there is a reality independent of our representations identifies not how things are in fact, but rather identifies a space of possibilities.

### A “Transcendental” Argument for External Realism.

* The only argument we could give for ER would be a “transcendental” argument in one of Kant’s many senses of that term: We assume that a certain condition holds, and then try to show the presuppositions of that condition.
  + Have to make precise what the view is that we are arguing against.
  + There is a simple transcendental argument against phenomenalist idealism.
    - Assumes a certain condition presuppositions of that condition. In
    - Condition” has to do with our practices and the “presupposition” is we, from our own first-person point of view, must presume when we engage in those practices
* Condition of intelligibility for normal understanding of these utterances is that there is a way that things are that is independent of human representations.
* If you follow out the line of describing normal understanding, soon reach conditions that are not truth conditions,
  + Sorts of conditions that help us to fix the truth conditions of our utterances.
* External Realism is a Background presupposition on the normal understanding of a very large class of utterances.
  + It differs from many other Background presuppositions in that it is both pervasive and essential
    - The sentences in question, as sentences of a public language, are assumed to be understood in the same way by any competent speaker and hearer.
    - Take it for granted that the utterances are about a publicly accessible reality
    - If each utterance contains a concealed reference to some special entity called “External Reality” with capital E and R; and that is precisely what we do not want to say.
  + A public language presupposes a public world in the ser¬se many (not all) utterances of a public language purport to make references to phenomena that are ontologically objective, they ascribe such and such features to these phenomena.
    - The existence of a way that things in the world independently of our representations of them is not a truth condition but rather a condition of the form of intelligibility that such statements have.
    - Any claim presupposes that there is a way that things are regarding the content of that claim.
* There is a way that things are in a publicly accessible, i.e. ontologically objective, \ realm.
  + The presupposition of a mind-independent reality already contains the presupposition of a representation-indpndnt reality, and that presupposition just is external realism.
    - A purely formal constraint.
  + Sentences as having truth conditions that are independent of our representations. By purporting to make reference to public phenomena,
    - Ontologically and not merely epistemically objective,
* The price of abandonment of realism is the abandonment of normal understanding. If someone wishes to abandon normal understand he or she owes us an account of what sort of understanding is possible.

### The Distinction Between Brute Reality and Socially Constructed Reality

* Exists independently of your or my representations of it.
* Marriages and money, unlike moun tains and atoms, do not exist independently of all representations, this distinction needs to be made explicit in the account
  + Facts about money can be epistemically objective if the existence of money is socially constructed, and, there: to that extent, ontologically subjective.
  + The class of speech acts that refer to a reality beyond themselves there is a subclass whose normal understanding requires a reality independent of all representation.
    - Socially constructed reality presupposes a reality in dependent of all social constructions, because there has to be something for the construction to be constructed of.
    - Eventually we reach a i bedrock of brute physical phenomena independent of all representations.
* Socially constructed reality presupposes a nonsocially constructed reality.
  + Iterations must bottom out in an X element that is not itself an institutional construction. Ɔtherwise you would get infinite regress circularity.
  + Purport to state facts that are “ontologically objective therefore “representation-independent”
    - We can see the difference if we put the counterfactual supposition into the claims, as follows:
* Statement is a representation and therefore to be understood as a statement must be understood as a representation.
  + Mind-independent features of the world an not require the existence of representation the world as part of the conditions of their normal intelligibility
    - Statements about money require the existence of representations as part of their conditions of normal intelligibility.

### Strengths and Limitations of the Foregoing Arguments

* Realism is part of the Background; and when functioning the Background is not a matter of intentional states at all.
  + One can be committed to the truth of a proposition without having any beliefs, thoughts, assumptions, hypotheses, or other “propositional attitudes
  + Prior to having reliefs.
  + Conditions of intelligibility, not about conditions of knowledge 1
  + There is no normal understanding of quantum mechanics or the set theoretical paradoxes.
    - Not every proposition about the world has a normal understanding:
  + There is nothing self-guaranteeing about normal understanding.
* We still rely on the external world to give our backup account of the subjective illusion of color. Similar remarks could be made about, for example, solidity.
* Philosophical theories make a tremendous difference to every aspect of our lives. In my observation, the rejection of realism, the denial of ontological objectivity, is an essential component of the attacks on epistemic objectivity, rationality, truth, and intelligence in in contemporary intellectual life.
* The first step in combating irrationalism is refutation of arguments against external realism and a defense of external realism as a presupposition of large areas of discourse.

## Truth and Correspondence

* Defend the idea that truth is a matter of correspondence to facts.
  + The correspondence theory as a methodological tool for the investigation of social facts.

### The Intuitive Idea of Truth as Correspondence

* Truth has to meet the condition that, For any sentence s,
  + S is true if and only if p
    - Called “disquotation,”=
      * The sentence quoted on the left-hand side occurs on the right with the quotation marks dropped.
    - Called “T sentences.
    - Requires some modification to deal with indexical sentences such as ‘I am hungry,” and purists will want to make careful distinctions among sentences, statements, and propositions
  + For any 8, s is true iff p.
    - A general name those conditions satisfied, is “fact.”
    - A verb when true, relate to facts is “correspond.”
      * For any s, s is true iff s corresponds to the fact that p.
* Not an attempt to define “true” without using other semannotions.
  + Would be circular because it uses such semantically loaded notions as “fact” and “correspond.”
  + We have deep philosophical urges to misunderstand all these points.

### Strawson’s Objections to the Correspondence Theory

* Claim is not that it is false to say that a true statement is one that corresponds to the facts, but rather that the correspondence theory gives us a false picture of the use of the word “true” and of the nature of facts.
  + When we ascertain the truth of a statement, we have, on the one hand, the statement, “The cat is on the mat,” and on the other hand, we have the complex thing or group of things. The fact that the cat is on the mat.
    - Correspondence is a matching or picturing relation between the elements of the statement and the elements of the fact.
    - hand in hand with the picture theory of meaning
      * Sentences have the meanings they do because they conventionalized pictures of facts.
        + Wittgenstein’s Tractatus¸

If it is plausible to think of the fact

“Are there negative facts?” “Of course not!”

* Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about.”7
  + Facts are not things in the world independent of language; rather, the word “fact,” like the words “statement” and “true” themselves, has a certain type of word-world-relating discourse built into it
* pseudorelational internal accusative sentences
* In none of these cases are there genuine relations between the entity named by the subject of the sentence and the pseudoentity referred to by the direct object.
  + Philosophical theory makes the false claims that facts are nonlinguistic entities and truth names a relation of correspondence between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic.

### Truth, Facts, Disquotation, and Correspondence

* An odd feature of the current literature: very little of it is concerned with the fact that “true” and “false” are evaluative terms used to describe certain kinds of success and failure.
  + word-(or mind)-to-world direction of fit.
  + It could be construed as a natural | consequence of the disquotation criterion for truth.
    - Disquotation makes it look as if the word “true” doesn’t really add anything to the original statement. It appears that saying “It’s true that the cat is on the mat” is just another way of sayThe cat is on the mat,” so it seems that the word “true” is redundant
      * Redundancy theory of truth,” the theory that the word “true” is redundant, describing nothing.
* We still need it as a shortfor stating infinite sets of disquotations, for saying such as, e.g., “From true premises only true conclusions can be validly derived.” But they nonetheless adhere to a “deflationary” or “deflationary” or minimalist” theory of truth, the theory that says there is really no property or relation denoted by “true.”
* A conception according to which there really are nonlinguistic facts in the world and statements are true because they really do stand in certain relations to these facts, relations that we variously describe as fitting,
* Language games we play with these words,
  + Its aim is to remove the false pictures that our misunderstandings of the language games engender.
  + Observations about word usage with some etymological speculations about how those usages might have evolved.
  + “True” comes from the same etymological root as “trust” and “trustworthy,” and all these from the Indo-European root “deru for “tree,” suggesting uprightness and reliability generally.
    - There not only true statements but true friends (real or genuine)
      * Need to ask: Under what conditions would we find a | statement trustworthy or reliable?
        + It does what it purports to do, that is, when it accurately states how things are.
* Aristotle articulated this conception when he said that to speak the truth is to say of what is that it is, and to say of what is not that it is not.
* “Fact.”
  + Derived from Latin “factum,” which is the neuter past particle of the verb “facere,” meaning “to do” or “to make.”
    - Hence, to mix three languages, one can say that the factum is the thing done, or the fait accompli.
  + Need a general term for what makes statements trustworthy, for what it is in virtue of which they are reliable.
    - Disquotation iterion only tells us for each case that something is
  + “Fact” has evolved to fill this need.
    - That in virtue of true statements are true.
    - Facts can only be stated and not named.
* Does not follow that facts are somehow essentially linguistic, that they have the notion of statement somehow built into them.
  + I have given they are precisely not linguistic (except, of course, for the small but important class of linguistic facts)
    - To have a notion for that which stands outside the statement but which makes it true, or in virtue of which it is true,
    - Facts are not complex objects, nor are linguistic entities; rather, they are conditions,
      * Process-product ambiguity; in
        + Between requirement and the thing required.
* Definitional connection
  + Disquotation gives the form
    - Tells us that the statement “The cat is on the mat” is true if and only if the cat is on the mat.
  + Correspondence criterion
    - tells us that the statement “The cat is on the mat” is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact.
  + Don’t have to establish in addition that statement
* Need a general word for assessing success and failure in achieving fit for representations that have the word-to-world direction of fit, and those words, among others less important, are “true” and “false.”
  + Statements are true if and only if they blank the facts.
    - Number of such verbs: “fit,” match,” “describe,” and “correspond to” are four.
    - Assertive speech acts.
    - Can be approximately true or roughly tru.
* Strawson was right to think that the correspondence theory engenders a false picture.
  + A classic example of we are misled by the surface grammar of words and sentences when we fail to look at the actual use of the expressions involved.
  + We understand the logic of the words involved, we see that facts are not complicated objects, and that there is no necessary isomorphism between the syntactical structure of true statements and the structure of facts.
  + Dealing with a small bunch of tautologies and their entailments.
    - Any appearance of conflict must derive from our urge to misunderstand them
  + There is no common property of truth,
    - “Snow is white” and “Grass is green” in virtue of which they are both true.
* Certain purely syntactical constraints are imposedSuppose you were designing a language for beings that did not already have one.
* on their application.
  + There is no content to the notion of truth
  + To state the obedience conditions of the order we do not restate the order.
    - Statement of truth conditions is a statement , but the statement of obedience condition for an order is not an order; it too is stateme
      * Illusion of redundancy is engendered bY the fact that stating truth conditions for statements is different from stating conditions of satisfaction for other sorts of speech acts.

### Designing a Language

* Thought experiment: Suppose you were designing a langu age for beings that did not already have one.
  + Devices for performing the various standard kinds of speech acts, such as statements, questions, commands, promises.
    - Would need ways of marking the distinction between the propositional content and the illocutionary force of the statement
      * Relate the propositional content to the real world in different ways, with different directions of fit,
        + you need different words to mark success or failure in achieving the fit between the proposition and the real world.
  + Orders have the world-to-word direction of fit,
    - Promises also have the world-to-word direction of fit, because of the point of the promise is to try to make the world change match the words.
  + Propositional content and reality, n
    - Aim of the statement is to get its propositional content to match an independently existing reality, not to change reality to match the propositional content
* Statement of the conditions of satisfaction of the order has a different direction of fit from the order itself. To state
  + Crucial terms for assessing success in achieving fit in the mode appropriate to statements,
  + You need words for the various actions that ɔnstitute obedience to orders, fulfillment of promises, etc. Ac
    - Actions do not need orders and promises to exist, but orders and promises need actions to be obeyed or kept.
* Just the expression of the propositional content of the statement. Facts don’t need statements
  + You can then state the definitional relations

### Summary and Conclusion

* “True” is the adjective for assessing statements (as well as, e.g., beliefs, that like statements have the mind-to-world or wordworld direction of fit)
* We need a metalinguistic predicate for assessing success in achieving the wordto-world direction of fit, and that term is “true.”
* How-things-are-in-theworld, and “fact” is one such term. Others are “situation” and “state of affairs.
* Statements determine their own truth conditions and because the term “fact” refers to that in virtue of which statements are true, the canonical way to specify the fact is the same as the way to specify the statement, by stating it.
  + Facts are not thereby linguistic in nature.
* But in general, substitution of coreferring definite descriptions does not yield reference to the same fact.
* Facts are not the same as true statements.
  + Functioning causally in a way it does not make sense to speak of true statements functioning causally
  + The relation of a fact to statements is one-many since the same fact may be by different statements.
* The philosophical disputes about color, and other secondary qualities, are about the nature of the facts that correspond to such claims as that this object is red, and the analysis of such requires more than disquotation.
* (only on) method in philosophy is to analyze the structure of the facts that make our statements true.
  + With the structure of social and institutional facts.

### APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9: THE SLINGSHOT ARGUMENT

* Technical-sounding argument originally attributed to Frege,
  + used by against modal logic, and recently revived by Donald Davidagainst the correspondence theory;
  + “the slingshot argument”
* Show that if a true statement corresponds to a fact, it corresponds to any and every fact; hence, notion of correspondence is completely empty.
  + All true statements correspond to the same thing.
* Step 1: Assumption:
  + Substitution instance of the correspondence theory, and the aim of the argument is to refute the theory by reducing the statement to absurdity.
* Step 2: Assumption
  + Preserves truth under the substitution of coreferring singular terms, and (b) it preserves truth under the substitution of logically equivalent sentences.
* There exists a semantics for definite descriptions according to which (a) and (b) are logically equivalent.)
  + Allowing substitutability of logically equivalent sentences a
    - First corresponds to the fact stated by the second.
* To show that any true statement corresponds to any and all facts.
  + The most that such an argument shows is the falsity of its presuppositions.
    - Logically equivalent sentences can be substituted salva veritate in contexts
* Whether or not the correspondence theory has unwanted logical consequences, so we cannot just reject the alleged consequences out of hand.
  + Whole notion of “fact” is relevant to this discussion is the notion of something that makes a statement true or in virtue of which it is true.
  + Counter to the ordinary intuitive notions.
  + The charge of begging the question is subject to tu quoque. It
  + Identity of not preserved under substitutability of logically equivalent sentences; and the sentence form
  + From true premises only true conclusions can be validly derived.

## Conclusion

* Just as mental ates are higher-level features of our nervous system, and consequently there is no opposition between the mental and the physical
  + the mental is simply a set of physical features of the brain at a higher level of description than that of neurons; so there is no opposition between culture and biology; culture is the form that bitakes.
    - If there were, biology would always win.
  + Cultures are different forms that an underlying biological substructure can be manifested in. ontology that includes cultural and institutional forms;
  + There is no radical break
    - Is special about culture is the manifestation of collective intentionality
      * Assignment of functions to phenomena where the function cannot be performed solely in virtue of the sheer physical features of the phenomena. New social facts where the facts exceed the physical features of the underlying physical reality.
* Is a continuum from the chemistry of However, though as serotonin and norepinephrine to the content of such mental states believing
  + Mental states are distinguished from other physical phenomena in that they are either conscious or potentially so.
  + Where there is no accessibility to consciousness, at least in principle, there are no mental states.
    - Institutional structures have a special feature, namely, symbolism.
      * Something beyond itself is the basic capacity that under lies not only language but all other forms of institutional reality as well.
        + Sounds or marks count as words and sentences, and certain sorts of utterances count as speech acts.
      * Agentive function is that of representing
        + Agents who can do this collectively have the fundamental precondition of all other institutional structures: